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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-ASPORTATION BY INNOCENT PURCHASER
State v. Patton, 271 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1954)
Defendant sold to an innocent purchaser for value a number of
concrete blocks belonging to a third party. In the absence of defen-
dant the purchaser removed the blocks from the actual owner's
premises and trucked them to his own farm. The Missouri Supreme
Court, affirming the trial court's conviction of defendant for larceny,
held that the movement of the blocks by the purchaser -was an aspor-
tation by the defendant.'
The requirement that there must be asportation before the crime
of larceny is committed existed at common law2 and is now generally
included in statutory definitions of larceny.3 The requirement is
easily satisfied in the usual factual situation in which a defendant
himself manually carries away property. The courts, however, have
not interpreted the requirement so rigidly that it encompasses only
this simple situation, but have affirmed convictions where the facts
show much less than a manual carrying away of goods. For example,
the use of artificial devices to transport property has been held suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of asportation even though the defen-
dant did not personally participate in the act of carrying the goods.'
Also, if an innocent agent of the defendant carries away the goods, an
asportation by the defendant has been accomplished. 5
The principal case involves circumstances somewhat different from
the innocent agent cases in that the party who actually removed the
property was acting for himself and not for the defendant. A ma-
jority of courts which have been confronted with this situation have
held the defendant guilty of larceny.6 A few courts, however, have
1. State v. Patton, 271 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1954).
2. M ILLERP, CRIMINAL LAW § 109 (1934). See 2 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAw §
1097 (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932).
8. E.g., M o. REV. STAT. § 560.155 (1949) provides that:
Every person who shall be convicted of feloniously stealing, taking and
carrying away any money, goods, rights in action, or other personal property,
or valuable thing whatsoever of the value of thirty dollars or more... shall
be deemed guilty of grand larceny....
See 32 Am. Jur., LARcENY § 2 (1941).
4. State v. Wellman, 34 1M1inn. 221, 25 N.W. 395 (1885) (larceny of gas by
means of pipe); People v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N.E.2d 403 (1937) (larceny
of electricity by means of wire).
5. Sea CLARK AND IARSIALL, CRIMES §§ 162, 326 (5th ed., Kearney, 1952).
6. Crutcher v. State, 156 Ark. 399, 246 S.W. 496 (1923) (overruling reasoning
to the contrary in Ridgel v. State, 110 Ark. 606, 162 S.W. 773 (1914)); Smith v.
State, 11 Ga. App. 197, 74 S.E. 1093 (1912); State v. Hunt, 45 Iowa 673 (1877);
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distinguished between the asportation performed by an innocent
purchaser and that done by an innocent agent and have held the
defendant seller not guilty when asportation has been accomplished
by the former.7
Generally, every crime which is malum in se includes both an overt
act and an unlawful intent by the defendant.8 The question raised by
the principal case is whether the act of an innocent purchaser can be
attributed to the defendant inasmuch as the purchaser was acting
for himself. It would seem that whether an actor intends to serve
himself or another is unimportant; the main factor is that a physical
removal of the property actuated by the felonious intent of the de-
fendant has been accomplished. Since the original purpose of the
asportation requirement probably was to insure that the owner
suffered a loss of possession 9 and since this is clearly accomplished
in the case where the removal is performed by an innocent purchaser,
it would seem sufficient for conviction to prove that the defendant had
a felonious intent vhich directly caused the carrying away of prop-
erty.
At least two states have legislatively eliminated the problem by
removing the asportation requirement in the statutory definition of
larceny. 10 Legislative action should not be necessary to. accomplish
the result reached in the principal case, however, since a broad inter-
pretation by the courts of the term "asportation" appears consonant
with the basic purpose behind the requirement.11 It is submitted,
therefore, that the Missouri Supreme Court reached the correct de-
cision in the principal case by following the majority view and
that opinions to the contrary are in error.
Cummins v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 200 (1883) ; Sanditen v. State, 22 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 14, 208 Pac. 1040 (1921). Florida makes the defendant's presence at
the time of the taking necessary. Compare Scott v. State, 138 Fla. 568, 189 So. 661(1939), witL Long v. State, 44 Fla. 134, 32 So. 870 (1902).
7. State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59, 11 So.2d 404 (1942); People v. Gillis, 6 Utah
84, 21 Pac. 404 (1889). In the Gillis case, however, it is questionable whether
there was a taking at all, since the defendant sold the property, an animal, to a
pound-keeper who already had custody of the property.
8. See M ILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 21 (1934).
9. See RAPAL.E, LARCENY AND KINDRED OFFENsEs g 26 (1892); 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1163 (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932).
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:67 (West 1951); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1410
(1953).
11. See text preceding note 9 supra.
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